1: All explanations known to be true are reducible to ‘physical processes’.
2: By induction this creates a strong bias in favor of physical explanations.
3: There is no strong evidence that any particular non-physical explanation is true.
Therefore thinking any particular non-physical explanation is true is epistemically unjustified.
This position could be countered by:
A: Producing strong evidence for a non-physical explanation.
B: Showing the application of induction to be inappropriate.
When I’ve used this line of reasoning the responses I’ve seen are:
- By claiming there are no supernatural events with strong evidence I am assuming what I’m trying to prove, as the only reason I think that is because I think there are no supernatural events.
- The entire project is misguided because whether a transcendent personal creator exists is a philosophical, not an empirical question.
- The epistemic value of induction possibly breaks down when looking at the creation of everything (this is my own objection).
The problem with 1 is I’m simply not making an assumption. And I’m not begging the question. However to realize why not it is necessary to actually understand what I am trying to say.